Serbia and Kosovo Twelve Years After the Brussels Agreement

By Owen Grossman

Twelve years ago in 2013, the two Western Balkan nations of Serbia and Kosovo met in Brussels to sign the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, better known as the Brussels Agreement. Just five years following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, the EU-led agreement was intended to bring the two countries closer to mutual recognition and on the path towards integration with the rest of the continent. The dialogue and resulting agreement brought great hope to the continent for a peaceful future in the Balkans, which had seen war two decades earlier. In the decade following, the policy adoption process has stalled, and renewed discussion in 2023 hasn’t made a difference. As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine rages on, it is important to understand the reasons why the normalization process has halted and how the EU can show dependability in crafting long-term peace if it seeks to have a favorable voice at the table.

Kosovo lies just south of Serbia on the Balkan Peninsula. A central part of the medieval Empire of Serbia, and home to many important Serb Orthodox Christian sites, it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1389. Over centuries of Ottoman rule, the demographics shifted, with Albanians becoming the vast majority by the time Serbia and Kosovo were reunited in the aftermath of World War I under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 culminated in several brutal wars and the independence of six countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Kosovo, which had held the status of a Socialist Autonomous Province under Serbia in the federal Yugoslav structure, remained de jure part of Serbia despite a 1991 declaration of the Republic of Kosovo. For the better part of the decade, tensions continued to flare as Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević hailed support for the region's Serb minority and the Kosovo Liberation Army formed to advance the Albanian majority’s intentions of sovereignty. In 1998, these tensions exploded into the Kosovo War. A controversial months-long NATO bombing campaign in 1999 brought the conflict to a close, with Kosovo placed under UN administration. Nine years later, Kosovo declared independence. Serbia refused to recognize this and submitted a request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule on the legality of the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Serbia defended itself under the Badinter Commission’s ruling that the principle of uti possidetis applied to the former Yugoslav Republics, giving legitimacy only to those nations that were formally republics within Yugoslavia. The ICJ eventually ruled in favor of Kosovo in 2010; despite this, Serbia has continued to contest the legitimacy of the Republic of Kosovo. It is with this context and continued tension that High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Policy Catherine Ashton convened in 2013 the prime ministers of both countries to find a path forward.

The Brussels Agreement has three main focuses across its fifteen points: Serb autonomy, wider national integration, and future EU relations. First, it calls for the Kosovo Assembly to establish the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM), a parallel institution for Kosovo’s Serb minority with the ability to manage economic development, education, health, as well as urban and rural planning. For integration, the agreement requires that all parallel police forces be merged into one Kosovo Police, as well as similar measures for the judicial system. These statutes further mandate that there be posts of the police and judicial branch headed by Kosovo Serbs designed to accommodate the needs of those in Serb-majority municipalities. Finally, and importantly for EU goals, is the directive for neither nation to obstruct the other’s path to EU admission. While most integration efforts have been implemented since expanded negotiations finished in August 2015, the creation of the ASM has become a sticking point. Despite the agreement being officially adopted by the Kosovo Assembly, opposition parties soon sparked a political crisis. A December decision by the Kosovo Constitutional Court found that while the ASM didn’t align completely with the spirit of the constitution, it should still be implemented. Kosovo politicians have failed to accomplish this, often citing the court's unclear ruling and uncertainty over issues of national sovereignty. They note the ASM would have executive capabilities with potential decentralizing effects, pointing to Bosnia and Herzegovina's federal government as an example. Kosovo’s failure to implement this continues to inhibit any further integration or recognition efforts from Serbia. Further complicating the matter is the nature of Kosovo as an indivisible piece of land. Both nations see it as having intrinsic national and/or religious value that can’t be sacrificed. Serbs value the historic Orthodox monasteries and the mythologized Battle of Kosovo, while Albanians stand strong with a connection to the ancient Illyrians as the original settlers of the region. Without an established functional ASM, the two countries can’t move forward to mutual recognition and a prolonged peace in a region still healing from the trauma of the 90s. 

Today, the European Union has a chance to push the normalization process along and prove its capability in negotiating complex international dilemmas. With an official policy of being “fully committed to the EU integration of the Western Balkans,” it’s important that it follows through. The 2023 Ohrid Agreement intended to revive discussion, but failed to apply adequate pressure to both sides or pay heed to the needs of the Kosovo Serb minority. This resulted in electoral boycotts and violent protests. It is extremely important to rectify this as the EU tries to find its place in peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, and as US President Donald Trump continues to be a driving force in international peacemaking. By applying adequate pressure on both Kosovo to implement the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities and on Serbia to allow Kosovo’s integration into international organizations, the EU can show that it is a strong mediator able to work with both sides. This would not only help bring the Western Balkans to long-term stability and EU accession, but also build credibility that could provide the EU with greater weight in Ukraine peace talks.