From Charles de Gaulle to Emmanuel Macron: should France’s vision of greater military autonomy shape Europe’s security future?
By Jorge Braceras
As of March 2025, debates over Europe’s security have taken a reformist turn following recent developments in American politics and international geopolitics. The Trump administration, in line with its transactional and confrontational approach, is pushing for increased burden-sharing within NATO and conditioning peace negotiations on US access to Ukraine’s rare earths. As the US appears to reassess its commitments and shift toward a more pragmatic relationship with Russia, Europe must reconsider its defense strategies and the reliance on traditional transatlantic security structures.
The start of the transition is already reflected in the now changing rhetoric of European leaders, who recognize that, for the next four years, the key to strengthening deterrence against Russia may not lie in transatlanticism. For example, Germany’s election winner, Friedrich Merz, declared the need for Europe to reinforce its own defense, which hints at a shift in Germany’s foreign policy. European leaders convened an emergency summit in London to address joint defense plans and the Russian threat among other topics.
Amid ongoing debates, France’s model of strategic autonomy resurfaces, raising a complex question explored in this article: Can France’s model of military autonomy serve as the foundation for a common European security strategy, or is the idea of an independent European defense merely an aspiration without practical viability? Despite obstacles, I argue that this policy will not only be a significant step toward greater autonomy but also a driving force in European politics in the coming years.
History of France’s military autonomy
On March 7, 1966, Charles de Gaulle announced that France was to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command. He believed France’s goal of preserving full control over its military decisions, especially the use of its nuclear arsenal, was being hindered by the increasing US-UK dominance, which restricted its ability to act in its own national interest. Under this decision, NATO forces were removed from French soil, and the headquarters were relocated to Brussels. De Gaulle decided not to leave the alliance’s political sphere and continued to cooperate in several strategic issues.
For over four decades, France pursued a defense policy marked by the doctrine of Force de Frappe, an independent nuclear deterrent designed to ensure strategic autonomy, which persisted even after 2009, when President Sarkozy reintegrated France into NATO’s military command. The balance between cooperation and autonomy has since been a quintessential aspect of France’s foreign policy, and Macron still embodies it. He has been especially interested in greater European strategic autonomy opposed to reliance on US military protection. One of his most important statements on the issue came on April 25, 2024, when he proposed the establishment of a European Defense Initiative to strengthen air defense and long-range operations.
What does strategic autonomy mean applied to Europe? How does it benefit the European citizen?
The concept of European strategic autonomy, as an extension of that pursued by France, implies the ability to act independently when deemed necessary while still cooperating with external allies if interests align, and it requires a massive expansion of European defense capabilities. Rather than sidelining NATO outright, it envisions the development of a European defense pillar that reduces reliance on it. Ideally, it includes NATO’s European member states and absorbs the European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation. The adoption of the EDF avoids major disagreements in financial resource pooling and allows smaller economies to invest in defense without divesting money from other areas.
Under this framework, member states should have to develop a more cohesive defense policy, increase military spending, improve interoperability among forces, establish a deployable military force, strengthen energy infrastructure, and consolidate their defense industry. While this process is neither easy nor fast, it should draw from the aforementioned EU measures, which have sought to reduce fragmentations in the defense industry but have not been successful in addressing capability gaps.
In terms of diplomacy, strategic autonomy involves reinforcing the idea of Europe as one independent, global actor. This requires the complicated task of overcoming the member states’ political differences regarding topics as diverse and vast as the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, China, or Russia. These divisions stem from historical narratives and different threat perceptions, and they often lead to incoherent responses and missed opportunities. European major powers need to avoid pursuing unilateral policies that complicate cohesion and risk reducing the continent’s influence. A clear example is Europe's response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. While Italy initially supported it for economic benefits, others like France and Germany were concerned over strategic dependence. Despite Italy’s late departure, the lack of coordination weakened Europe’s bargaining position.
Economically, it means reinforcing self-sufficiency in specific, fundamental industries such as defense, energy, technology (specifically AI, quantum computing, cyber-capabilities), and raw materials (including rare earths). Achieving this requires increasing investments in domestic production, reinforcing supply chains, and putting efforts to reduce reliance on external powers in sectors where Europe is dependent on the United States or China. This change is not just about economic security; it is also about making sure technology and industry support strategic goals and do not become weak points in a crisis. The first steps are already underway, as the EDF has seen unprecedented engagement, with 298 proposals submitted for its 2024 call, competing for €1.1 billion in funding. This 25% increase from the previous year proves the commitment within the EU defense industry to collaborate in areas such as ground combat, space, air combat, or energy resilience. The trend is also reflected in national initiatives, such as Greece’s announcement of a €25 billion plan over the next decade to modernize its military with advanced high-tech warfare technologies, or Denmark’s intentions to reinforce its naval capabilities through the acquisition of new vessels.
Europe's drive for self-sufficiency is evident in its efforts to secure critical raw materials essential for various industries. The European Union is accelerating plans to produce minerals like gallium, vital for semiconductors, 5G antennas, and military radar systems. Projects across multiple member states aim to decrease reliance on imports, particularly from China, thus enhancing Europe's strategic autonomy in technology and manufacturing sectors. By investing in domestic industries and reducing external dependencies, Europe will gradually position itself to deal with forthcoming challenges more effectively and independently.
Challenges: Is Europe’s strategic autonomy an overly idealistic goal?
The first problem is what would happen with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and, specifically, the Common Defence and Security Policy. Both are cornerstones of European integration, but their limitations in strategic autonomy are evident. The current framework is tied to consensus among EU member states and does not include key actors like the UK. Moreover, its existence is inherently adjacent to that of NATO, making it thus necessary to accommodate it to the new organization. This would likely create tensions within the EU itself, as not all members are equally willing to distance themselves from NATO. Poland and the Baltic States rely on NATO’s deterrence and may perceive that such a transition could threaten their integrity.
Furthermore, the foreign policies of major powers like France and the UK are quite different from each other and from those of other countries. France focuses on the Sahel region, counterterrorism, and keeping its influence over former colonies, which means it invests heavily in military operations and development programs in Africa. The UK, on the other hand, puts more emphasis on its ties with the Anglosphere, shaping its approach to trade, security, and diplomacy. These differences create tensions with European partners, especially when it comes to coordinating foreign aid, military strategies, or intelligence sharing, as each country has its own priorities and ways of handling global challenges.
There are also challenges regarding energy policies, Poland and Germany are great contrasting examples. Poland is heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with approximately 85% of its energy sourced from such materials, making it one of the most carbon-intensive economies in Europe. Germany, on the other hand, has pursued the Energiewende and a transition to green energy, with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving carbon neutrality. To tackle this challenge, Europe needs to develop joint energy projects that respect each country's control over its own resources. Investing in shared renewable energy infrastructure, like cross-border wind farms or joint nuclear facilities, would not only strengthen energy security but also support strategic defense needs. Creating a European energy consortium within the defense sector could help direct funding into key energy technologies necessary for military operations. This would focus on building more resilient energy grids, securing communication networks, and improving energy efficiency in defense systems. For these initiatives to succeed, they would need transparent management, fair financial contributions, and a shared commitment to both energy security and defense, laying the groundwork for a more independent and unified European defense strategy.
Finally, the rise of nationalism across Europe, driven by the growth of far-right and third-position movements, is a big obstacle. These movements, which focus on national sovereignty and distrust of transnational organizations, oppose initiatives that could be seen as undermining national control over military decisions. Such emphasis on national interests makes it difficult to develop a cohesive European defense strategy, as people prioritize domestic policies, and efforts to pool resources and reach a consensus on security policy are opposed. Unless nationalist sentiments are redefined, any attempt to build a European military structure risks being dismissed as another distant, top-down initiative. The solution is not to push for a version of Europeanism that overrides national identities but to frame cooperation as a way to protect them. Instead of presenting defense integration as a bureaucratic obligation, it should be positioned as a way to strengthen national security, where working together enhances sovereignty rather than weakening it. Governments could highlight past examples of successful regional military cooperation like Franco-British interventions in Libya to show that countries can collaborate effectively without giving up control. A security strategy based on these principles would stand a far better chance of gaining support from both policymakers and the public.
Conclusion
European strategic autonomy will be a developing process driven by structural constraints and national divergences. France's model is a politically coherent and historically informed template, but its realization depends on bridging the continent's economic inequalities, foreign policy divergences, and increasing nationalist demands. With US foreign policy growing increasingly unstable, Europe cannot afford to rely on outside powers for security. Instead, it must devise a strategy of defense as a function of long-term sustainability and not a function of reacting to align itself. Premature centralization would risk internal disintegration. However, through pragmatism investing, perpetual diplomacy coordination, and policy bending, an autonomous European defense is not merely preferable, it is crucial and achievable.
