Beyond Fascist Solidarity: Mussolini's Strategic Gamble in Spain
By Jorge Braceras
The Spanish Civil War was a conflict that began between July 17 and 18, 1936, as a result of a failed military uprising led by Francisco Franco and Emilio Mola. The war quickly took on international dimensions with the involvement of several countries supporting either the nationalist or the republican side. The United Kingdom and France remained neutral, pursuing a non-interventionist policy. However, the Soviet Union supported the republican side and organized the International Brigades, while Italy and Germany sent soldiers, aid, and weapons to the national faction. Mussolini decided to intervene en masse in the conflict on July 27, barely one week after the war had started.
This essay studies the causes that led to the Italian intervention, exploring the ideological affinities and strategic goals Mussolini considered days before taking a final decision. I defend that, despite the ideological similarities, what motivated il Duce the most was the benefits a Fascist Spain would bring him in his Mediterranean quest.
Mussolini’s ideological and strategic position the Western Mediterranean
Using Emilio Gentile’s definition, which pertains this work the most, fascism was a modern political phenomenon, characterized by its strong nationalist, antimarxist, and antiliberal views. The movement was both revolutionary in its promotion of a new totalitarian order and reactionary in its intent to restore traditional hierarchies. Franco, despite meeting some of these aspects, did not have a defined ideology and did not align himself consistently with fascist doctrine. His war and will were a “crusade against communism.” Anticommunism was what united Italian fascism, the rebels, and Franco’s personalist views.
To understand how such a broad ideological framework led Mussolini to intervene in Spain, it is necessary to trace events back to April 14, 1931, when the Second Spanish Republic was democratically proclaimed. In Italy, the newborn regime was quickly rejected due to its inherent liberal parliamentarian character, its leaders’ staunch antifascism, and the fear that Spain would fall under French influence. Mussolini was especially scared that democratic regimes would succumb to communism, and the ideology would spread throughout France and Spain, therefore affecting the entire West Mediterranean region.
Italy’s sphere of influence was the Mediterranean. This explains its Moroccan policy during the 1920s and its drive to build an African empire. Another area of interest was the Balkans and the Danube basin, but since France also had interests there and Germany considered it part of its own sphere, Mussolini had to tread carefully in order to maintain relations with the Third Reich.
Mussolini aimed to control the western Mediterranean by establishing military bases in the Balearic Islands and fostering cooperation with Spain, which also had access to the Atlantic. Expelling the British would significantly strengthen Italy’s strategic position. Italian bases in the Balearics would weaken British communications—already vulnerable at Suez—and could even push London to abandon the Mediterranean route altogether. These bases would also bolster Italy’s stance against France. Mussolini declared, “not a single Black man will go from Africa to France via the Mediterranean route”.
Bearing such strategic implications in mind, right after the establishment of the Republic, Mussolini wrote twelve aphorisms sharply criticizing the new regime, even considering it a delayed imitation of the French Revolution. Among these, aphorisms eight and nine are the outstanding ideological reflections where he expresses his fears:
- Kerensky does not call for Nicholas. He prepares Lenin.
- Nowadays, it is no longer a matter of republic or monarchy, but of communism or fascism.
The eighth aphorism is a reference to Alexander Kerensky, Russian revolutionary and politician key during the Revolution of 1917. In Russia, he was seen as a guarantor of the ancient regime, despite him being Lenin’s precursor. The ninth reflects Mussolini’s understanding of Spanish politics under the international context, where authoritarian and totalitarian regimes were steadily spreading throughout Europe. He thought liberal democracies and republics were deemed to communism. Albeit less important, aphorisms seven, eleven, and twelve are critiques toward democracy, which Mussolini called a risk because some Italians desired to build a similar system. While doing so, he also called for violence as a means of avoiding or destroying such system.
The Spanish Republic lasted until 1936, but not without instability. The Sanjurjo coup d’état, commonly known as Sanjurjada, took place on August 10, 1932. It was an unsuccessful military uprising led by General José Sanjurjo that aimed to overthrow the republican government and restore a more authoritarian regime. Nonetheless, it was quickly suppressed and Sanjurjo sent to jail. Mussolini played an important but not definitive role in the coup, as he promised to help and send aid. Sanjurjo counted on such aid, but it never arrived because the logistics had been poorly organized. The rebels did not have the sufficient means to overthrow the system.
It would not be until March 1934 that Mussolini started to conspire against the republic once more. Traditionalists Antonio Goicoechea, leader of Renovación Española (Spanish Renewal) – a party with the goal of overthrowing the Republic – Antonio Lizarza Iribarren, Rafael Olazábal, and Emilio Barrera met with Mussolini and agreed on the shipment of aid in case their insurgency was successful. One of the key principles of the agreement was that Mussolini explicitly demanded that the conspirators not make any deals with France. The accord was an important driving force for the antidemocratic factions and entailed a rapprochement to fascism. By this time, relations between Italy and France had worsened with the arrival of León Blum’s Popular Front to the French government in June 1936, which had also coincided with the Spanish Popular Front’s victory.
The Duce feared a loss in political hegemony in the West Mediterranean under the guise of a popular front alliance between Spain and France (the “frentepopularismo”). In this sense, it is possible that the French Popular Party’s initial willingness to help the Spanish Republic incited Mussolini to send the national side aid right after the war started. However, when Mussolini took the decision, the French had not yet agreed on whether sending weapons and aid was necessary or not.
The days before
The decline in relations with the Western democracies and Mussolini’s growing ideological affinity with Hitler encouraged him to strengthen ties with Germany, a country with no strategic interests in the Mediterranean and therefore willing to support Italian actions in the region. Ambassador Luccardi informed Mussolini that the British were prepared to block Republican ships from passing through the Strait of Gibraltar if requested by the rebels, as they feared a social revolution in Spain due to their interests in the mining industry. On July 28, Mussolini learned through SIM (Military Intelligence Service) that Germany also intended to support the rebels, which confirmed the decision he had made the previous day.
However, days before, Mussolini’s stance on the conflict was not positive. In response to Franco's request for 12 bombers and three fighter planes, Mussolini replied with a simple “No,” which disconcerted the national faction. Later, on July 25, Antonio Goicoechea, sent by Emilio Mola, met with Galeazzo Ciano to inform him of the situation and to urge him to send assistance. He referred to the March 1934 agreement, in which Mussolini had promised support for an uprising against the Republic.
Franco later sent Mussolini a message through Luccardi, a member of the Military Intelligence Service, in which he pledged to establish a fascist-style republican government and expressed his intention to prevent Spain from becoming a Soviet satellite. This promise, made in the context of an unstable international environment in which Mussolini lacked allies, could explain his decision to intervene. It is worth noting that in this communication, Franco referred to the rebels as the “non-Marxist Spanish army,” implying the presence of a Marxist army on the Republican side.
Because the decision was taken on July 27, both the meeting between Ciano and Goicoechea and Franco’s letter could have also been paramount factors for the Italian intervention. Whether Mussolini decided to intervene solely because of these reasons or not is a different question, but Mussolini did have ideological, historical, and strategic motivations to make an Italian success out of the Spanish Civil War.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe that anti-communism was, to some extent, one of the main reasons for the intervention, as the ideology threatened Mussolini’s position within his sphere of influence, leading him to perceive it as a loss of prestige for his regime and a challenge to his expansionist ambitions. Il Duce viewed the political and ideological conflict as one that would ultimately be decided between fascism and communism. For this reason, from the moment the Republic was proclaimed, he had cooperated with the Spanish conspirators.
However, this was not the only cause, and likely not even the most significant. As I have mentioned, the Italian intervention was a phenomenon with multiple causes. Nor does it support a singular explanation that Mussolini’s stance, as he himself admitted, changed depending on the reports he received. The international context also played a role, as Mussolini had no allies and saw in this war a chance to win the friendship of both Franco and Hitler. In my view, intervention as a means of seeking allies was the most important reason behind it. What leads me to think so is the fact that Mussolini made the decision to intervene on the very day he read that note from Franco.
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