What to Make of The European Union’s Outreach to the Indo Pacific
Written by Sapna Suresh; Edited by Andrew Ma
Published on May 12th, 2025
Washington’s increasing attacks on the transatlantic alliance have led to the Europeans to seek partners elsewhere, especially in the Indo-Pacific. In March 2025, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen visited India to deepen relations, and according to latest reports, India and the European Union are negotiating a free trade agreement. In the coming weeks, Vietnam is set to host EU officials and on March 11, the EU and South Korea announced a digital trade deal. These outreach efforts by the EU illustrate its desire to look for alternative partners beyond Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. However, to deepen cooperation, the EU should put more emphasis on its commitment to multilateralism, rather than hyper-focusing on human rights.
Intra EU. Divisions on the US
In September 2021, the EU released its Indo-Pacific strategy, including key principles promoting human rights, supporting sustainable development initiatives, upholding the rules based international order, and increasing cooperation with key actors, such as ASEAN, India, and Japan. However, the role of the US and NATO remains a source of division within the EU. In Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it advocates to “work within NATO to develop relations with ‘Partners Across the Globe’ (including Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea).” Likewise, in the Dutch Indo-Pacific strategy, it said that “The EU should seek to link up with the NATO partnerships in the region,” referring to existing partnerships NATO has with Australia, South Korea, and Japan. Similarly, Latvia and Finland also are of the view that the US should play a role in any EU involvement in the Indo-Pacific.
By contrast, the role of NATO is absent in France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, seeing NATO as overtly dominated by the US, and argues that NATO should not have a role in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in July 2023, Paris blocked the opening of a NATO office in Tokyo, arguing that NATO’s purpose is the European continent, not China and the Indo-Pacific. On the other hand, Germany continues to shape its security policy around NATO and a close partnership with the Americans. For example, despite being invited, France did not participate in the Partnership for the Blue Pacific, while Germany did.
The EU Seeing China as a Rival and Partner
Additionally, the EU continues to view China as a systemic rival and partner. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a growing concern of the EU was the Sino-Russian relationship. In May 2024, von der Leyen said,
“More effort is needed to curtail delivery of dual-use goods to Russia that find their way to the battlefield. And given the existential nature of the threats stemming from this war for both Ukraine and Europe, this does affect EU-China relations.”
However, there is also an interest to continue to cooperate with China. For example, in von der Leyen’s May 2023 speech to the European Commission on relations with China, she said it is “neither viable – nor in Europe's interest – to decouple from China.” In the speech, she also acknowledged that China is an important partner in the fight against climate change. In light of the growing transatlantic rift, there is a desire by the EU to balance its relationship with China, as reflected in Von der Leyen’s February 2025 remarks.
These remarks mirror similar remarks by various European countries. In February 2025, the Spanish foreign ministerJosé Manuel Albares said that the EU should have their own China policy, not follow the confrontational one led by Washington. On March 28, 2025, the French foreign minister Jean-Noel Barrot went to China and said “the current context requires a powerful Franco-Chinese partnership in the service of geopolitical stability, prosperity and the future of our planet,” during a visit to Beijing Language and Culture University.
Looking to Other Actors
Considering the growing transatlantic rift, the EU is searching for alternative partners that are not China, Russia, or the US. Some of these countries include India, ASEAN (and individual member-states), Central Asia, South Korea, and Japan. However, to deepen cooperation, the EU should focus more on its commitment to multilateralism rather than human rights, when seeking partnerships with various Indo-Pacific countries.
As stated before, promoting human rights and democracy is a key pillar in the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. However, this issue becomes complicated at the get-go as the EU seeks partnerships with countries with a questionable, if not egregious human rights record. The best strategy for the EU is to put more emphasis on its commitment to multilateral diplomacy, rather than singling countries out over their human rights. The human rights angle will be detrimental to EU interests as it raises the concerns of hypocrisy, as Brussels criticizes some countries but not others. Focusing more on multilateralism will be more beneficial for the EU in the long-run as most Indo-Pacific countries share the core EU position that the region should not be divided up into spheres of influence by the US, Russia, or China.
