What Comes After Orbán: The Tisza Wave and the Opposition's Dilemma

By Elek Krizsán

The meteoric rise of the Tisza party has imposed the spectre of a rendszerváltás ("regime change") over Hungary. As in 1989, Tisza uses this term to describe its intention to defeat Fidesz following its fourth consecutive term in office.

The united opposition's attempt to unseat Orbán in 2022 failed spectacularly, seemingly ending any realistic hope of defeating Fidesz. Six traditional opposition parties had formed a coalition behind Péter Márki-Zay, the mayor who had captured Hódmezővásárhely from Fidesz's grip, making him seem like the ideal challenger. Instead, the coalition performed worse together than they had separately in 2018.

The failure was devastating because it confirmed the effectiveness of Fidesz's electoral engineering. After winning a supermajority in 2010, the party rewrote electoral rules to entrench its advantage—gerrymandering districts, changing vote allocation formulas, and creating a system where coalition governments struggle to form. The 2022 collapse suggested that even a united opposition couldn't overcome these structural barriers.

Tisza has changed that calculus. The party has reshaped the political landscape, displacing the traditional opposition and drawing support across the political spectrum. It now leads Fidesz in polls, presenting the first credible challenge to Orbán's grip on power since 2010. 

Opposition parties face a critical dilemma: will participating in the election hasten or hinder Fidesz's defeat, and is the risk of Fidesz remaining in power a greater concern than being excluded from political decision-making? Many have opted to abstain as their way of contributing to Fidesz's defeat, while others have chosen to hold out.

Tisza’s rise

Péter Magyar, Tisza's leader, began his political ascent after breaking ranks from Fidesz. In early 2024, a scandal erupted when President Katalin Novák granted a pardon in a high-profile child abuse case, a particularly salient scandal given Fidesz's "family-friendly" positioning. The decision, countersigned by Justice Minister Judit Varga, Magyar's wife at the time, sparked public outrage. Both women were forced to resign to avoid broader scrutiny.

Magyar broke ranks. He began giving interviews to opposition media and posting on Facebook about systemic corruption within Fidesz, rapidly building a massive following. As his audience grew, he developed a political agenda focused on exposing the Orbán regime's inner workings. To capitalize on his momentum and ensure he could contest the June 2024 European Parliament elections, he took over a dormant party called Respect and Freedom ("Tisza").

He then embarked on a nationwide tour, hosting forums, conversations, and speeches to build a political base and develop a political platform. He has demonstrated support through strong turnout to his events on national holidays, and he has galvanised and expanded his reach into rural Hungary through "Tisza Islands," or local political forums—taking a page from Fidesz's 2000s playbook. Meanwhile, Magyar leveraged his ability to capture media attention to draw the public eye towards the dismal state of Hungary's hospital system. The dominant theme throughout the past months has been Magyar's ability to suffocate Fidesz's ability to direct discourse. In the communications battle, he can be said to have prevailed, with growing support even within Fidesz fortresses, having overtaken Orbán's party in virtually all polls.

Magyar has made a point of avoiding cooperation with the traditional opposition so as to avoid being associated with its political baggage. Fidesz often groups opposition parties as "the Left" and associates them with the political enemies it has targeted—namely, George Soros, Ferenc Gyurcsány (former Prime Minister and former leader of the Democratic Coalition), and Brussels. Tisza's recently nominated parliamentary candidates were carefully selected to avoid displaying any continuity with the traditional opposition for this very reason. By publicly repudiating the opposition, Magyar has largely managed to avoid the perception that he is more of the same. 

Tisza has positioned itself as an inclusive but anti-Fidesz political tent planning a technocratic centrist government, aiming to unite a broad spectrum of the electorate by avoiding a left-right dichotomy. Tisza's core message has been one of unity against corruption and the entrenched Orbán regime, with key priorities including holding corrupt Orbán allies accountable and dismantling their economic control. Meanwhile, it has promised to keep popular Fidesz policies like the 13th month pension, family tax benefits, and fuel subsidies, while continuing to oppose illegal migration and neutrality on Ukraine. Tisza has joined the European People's Party (EPP), the centre-right European political family that Fidesz was pushed out of in 2021, signalling its intent to displace Fidesz on its own terms. Meanwhile, its commitment to joining the European Prosecutor's Office, devolution of authority to local governments, and efforts to create a technocratic government signal Tisza's intent to occupy the space of pro-rule-of-law conservatism in Hungary. This positioning allows Tisza to draw support from disaffected voters across the political spectrum.

Will Tisza be another Fidesz?

Tisza is built almost entirely around Péter Magyar, with no other public figure approaching his prominence. While the fact that the party is still developing may excuse this for now, its heavy reliance on a single charismatic leader echoes the very model Fidesz follows. This resemblance carries serious risks: that Magyar, like Orbán, could centralise and consolidate power, construct a clientelistic political apparatus akin to the System of National Cooperation (NER), and ultimately entrench himself as the dominant force in Hungarian politics. To avoid this, Hungary, under a new government, must implement real and meaningful reforms. Magyar appears committed to this, with Tisza's accountability program proposed in the party's summer Congress.

Tisza and Magyar's communication places the party firmly on the side of a free press and civil society, and its commitment to a two-term limit on Prime Ministers indicates they are seeking to prevent such a possibility. Meanwhile, Tisza's process to select parliamentary candidates for Hungary's 106 electoral districts tried to ensure candidate competition and independence. First, party leadership pre-vetted potential candidates. Then, once these candidates had a chance to interact with the community and display their political acumen—a process that ended on November 30—party members selected candidates for their districts in a two-round election. By democratising the party's internal processes, Magyar signals that his government would be more democratic than Fidesz's, where Orbán holds a tight grip over strategy and decision-making. However, he has not been consistently benign, seeming at times to prefer personal politics and pressure tactics to democratic processes.

Regardless of Magyar's intentions, there is a broader systemic risk: the mere replacement of one single-party rule with another. Given Tisza's intense focus on dismantling Fidesz's economic power—naming his accountability program the "Road to Prison Program"—there is a real possibility that Fidesz, following an electoral defeat, could collapse as its economic foundations are pulled out from beneath it. Without a robust opposition, Tisza would find itself in a position similar to that of Fidesz now. 

This leads us in two directions. First, how will the Orbán regime try to avoid this scenario? Second, what is the opposition's optimal strategy to ensure its views are represented?

Fidesz on the defensive

Presented with a capable adversary, Fidesz has sought to leverage a number of political levers to undermine Tisza. In a reversal of previous policies, it has sought to prop up the failed opposition parties. In past elections, Fidesz reduced state campaign funding, but now chose to raise funding for parties with representation in parliament—notable given Tisza's absence (there have been no parliamentary elections since it formed). In propping up these parties, Fidesz hopes to shore up its support ahead of elections in the hopes of weakening Tisza. Meanwhile, Fidesz and its media allies have repeatedly tried and failed to find a message that would undermine Magyar's support, whether by generating a scandal or by associating him with the opposition. To recapture the information space from opposition leaders, Fidesz created the failed "Fight Club" to organically flood social media with their messaging. 

Fidesz's positioning in response to Tisza's rise has been comparatively weak. In 2022, it was able to paint the united opposition as war-mongering, left-leaning puppets of Brussels. These attacks have found no foothold in the face of Tisza's efforts to fortify its image. Meanwhile, Fidesz has been on the back foot. In response to Magyar's country-wide tour, Orbán has embarked on one, too. In response to the Tisza Islands, Fidesz has introduced "Digital Civic Circles." Where Tisza positions itself as open and democratic, Fidesz has remained isolated and aloof, though as Tisza's popularity rises, it has increasingly made attempts to appeal to a more general voter base. Rather than determining the direction of Hungarian political discourse, Fidesz seems to have ceded initiative to Tisza. 

With a year left until elections must be held, Fidesz has a number of underhanded options to ensure it prevails. It has introduced a variety of policies that could conceivably be used to target Magyar. In any case, they are sure to force him to tread carefully. For example, the government introduced an asset declaration requirement for MEPs, requiring them to publicly disclose their declarations and threatening suspension of immunity for any errors. Such rules were not applicable to MPs, clearly targeting Magyar. On the other hand, the government sought to entrap Magyar, whether legally or rhetorically, by prohibiting the Pride parade this June, along with similar rhetorical traps. Had he encouraged a gathering to protest such a move, he would have been exposed to political and legal attacks. This gambit ultimately failed, with the parade drawing enormous support under Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony's organisation. As Tisza's lead over Fidesz grows ever-larger, the government is sure to draw on every tool at its disposal to hold onto power. Whether they will is uncertain. A recent effort to restrict civil society saw surprising opposition within the party's ranks, leading to the bill's eventual retraction. 

Meanwhile, the traditional opposition

The establishment opposition has taken various strategies to the threat Tisza presents, from competing to accommodating. However, the 5% electoral threshold means that most of the traditional opposition have no prospect of winning seats in 2026 based on current polling. Outside the two main contenders, only the Democratic Coalition (DK) and Our Homeland ("Mi Hazánk"), a far-right, government-aligned party, appear to stand a chance. Regardless, opposition parties' strategies now will shape the political landscape in years to come.

DK, a mainstay of the opposition, remains around 5%, having fallen from support that had consistently remained between 10-20% previously. The party has sought to rejuvenate its image, changing presidents changed leadership, replacing former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány with his ex-wife, Klára Dobrev. This is likely an effort to put an end to the political baggage tied to him that has continuously dampened DK's popular support. Jobbik, which recently ceded its spot at the far-right of Hungarian politics to the Mi Hazánk ("Our Homeland") party since moderating its messaging as an effort to appeal to a broader base, appears to have plans to compete. The party has lost significant ground in recent years, now polling in the low single digits. Momentum has withdrawn, hoping that will help ensure Fidesz is defeated while continuing to work toward true regime change.

Ákos Hadházy, an independent MP who has become one of Hungary's most popular politicians for his dogmatic anti-corruption investigations, has often expressed scepticism toward Magyar, though he largely supports him. He has stated his intention to run regardless of what happens as a matter of principle. He wants to avoid another political system dictated by a single man. Despite his popularity, he is not invulnerable to Tisza threats. Meanwhile, Péter Márki-Zay, the opposition coalition's candidate for Prime Minister in 2022, has expressed his support for Magyar as the best hope for bringing down the Orbán government. 

Across the political landscape, it appears that those with the greatest chance of making it into parliament are the only ones committing to run in the next election. The others have capitulated in favour of a movement more able to achieve their objective of replacing Orbán, and perhaps hoping for a seat at the table once that is achieved.

How the traditional opposition should play their hand 

Magyar has acknowledged that every district counts. If Tisza manages to secure a two-thirds majority, it will have unbridled agency to implement its agenda, and Magyar is clearly angling for such a result. However, Tisza’s 106 candidates will actually have to win their districts—not a simple task.  

This provides strong opposition candidates with significant leverage. Only 106 of the parliament's 199 seats are selected through electoral districts. The rest are allocated to parties based on votes for their party's list, with the addition of the margin by which candidates won in their respective districts, called winner compensation. Thus, strong opposition candidates can hurt Tisza's chances even if they come second. A strong second-place showing by an opposition candidate would erode the margin by which Tisza wins, thus reducing the total votes allocated to their party's list. A strong opposition candidate's withdrawal—whether or not they have a prospect of outright victory—would therefore significantly benefit Tisza. 

Converting Tisza's polling strength into district victories presents its own challenge. While the party leads nationally, translating that support into wins across Hungary's individual constituencies requires strong local campaigns, credible candidates, and coalition-building. To defeat Fidesz, Tisza will need every vote to count. This makes opposition cooperation not merely beneficial but potentially necessary for maximizing Tisza's parliamentary representation.

How best to play these cards?

Opposition withdrawals serve Tisza's interests even without fear of electoral loss. Each withdrawal increases Tisza's victory margin in that district, which directly translates to additional list votes. For a party pursuing a supermajority, these marginal gains matter. This creates a transactional basis for negotiation: opposition parties can offer something Tisza wants (margin improvements) in exchange for policy concessions or governance assurances. These assurances should be designed to preserve pluralism and create conditions where the opposition can reemerge in the next cycle.

The goal must be to create a strong, sustainable system to replace Fidesz's government. A minority government would cripple Tisza's ability to implement systemic reforms. Without the votes to restore judicial independence, strengthen press freedom, or dismantle Fidesz's economic networks, Tisza would preside over four more years of political and economic stagnation. Voters, frustrated by continued dysfunction, would likely return to what they know: Fidesz. This makes a decisive Tisza victory, whether simple majority or supermajority, essential for regime change to succeed.

The opposition should adopt an approach of strategic patience, prioritising regime change while preserving democratic pluralism. Smaller parties consistently polling below the 5% threshold should follow Momentum's example and withdraw. By stepping back, they allow voters to coalesce around Tisza. A fragmented opposition serves only Fidesz's interests, and every vote diverted from Tisza weakens the chances of achieving regime change—these parties' primary objective. Diverting votes to parties with no chance of winning seats is a clear benefit only to Fidesz.

Parties or candidates with more substantial support, like DK and Hadházy, should engage in a more complex strategy. Rather than capitulate or back down, they should force Tisza to gain support organically rather than from a lack of alternatives. This serves multiple purposes: it tests Tisza's true strength, encourages a robust and unifying platform, and ensures that these parties and candidates retain political leverage. As the election nears, these parties and candidates should offer to withdraw in exchange for concessions from Tisza to advance or accommodate their agendas. Strategic withdrawal would maximise the benefit to Tisza's chances at a supermajority, thus maximising the opposition's leverage. This would both facilitate a change in government and allow Tisza to continue to avoid direct association with the traditional opposition, while indirectly helping to maintain and strengthen political pluralism. 

​​The mechanics matter: negotiations should occur privately in the weeks before the election, with public withdrawal and endorsement happening only in the final days. This timing prevents Fidesz from associating Tisza with the traditional opposition during the campaign while still delivering the margin boost Tisza needs. However, given that last-minute withdrawal undermines the opposition's credibility and bargaining position, they should only take this step after securing concrete, verifiable commitments from Tisza.

Coordination is crucial, as the marginal votes from a single district are unlikely to tip the scales on the list vote tallies. Orchestrated withdrawals could meaningfully shift list allocations and incentivise Tisza to negotiate. But 2022 demonstrated the opposition cannot coordinate effectively. Therefore, it is more likely that individual candidates or parties trade withdrawals for minor concessions rather than inter-opposition bargaining.

The opposition should also prepare for post-victory scenarios. Tisza's rapid rise has been driven by Péter Magyar's personality and political savvy, unifying Hungarians around their dissatisfaction with the current government. Once the objective of regime change is achieved, this coalition is likely to fracture to some degree. Opposition parties that maintain their organisational capacity and distinct identities will be better positioned to capitalise on such developments, perhaps by pushing for accelerated elections.

The stakes are too high for posturing and political vanity. Hungary's democracy hangs in the balance, and opposition parties must prioritise the nation above their individual ambitions. Those with genuine support should maintain their campaigns to preserve truly representative politics and ensure Tisza faces real electoral competition, while those without viable paths to parliament should step aside. However, even parties with substantial backing should consider strategic withdrawal if doing so becomes necessary to defeat Fidesz. This approach offers the best chance of both defeating Fidesz and preserving the pluralistic opposition Hungary will need in the post-Orbán era.