Missile Warfare and Air Defense in the Ukraine Conflict: Evaluating Long-Range Systems and Ukraine's Defenses Against Russian Threats

By Henry Robinson; Edited by Andrew Ma

Introduction

Financial and military aid to Ukraine has spanned over a decade, predating the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War. Between 2008 and 2012, the Obama administration provided Ukraine with $600 million in non-lethal military equipment. This assistance included armored infantry vehicles, counter-battery radar systems, and Raven UAVs to mitigate separatist aerial attacks. However, the U.S. refrained from supplying Ukraine with long-range missiles or advanced anti-air defense weapons. The Russo-Ukrainian war has been marked by mutual short-range missile and drone attacks, but Ukraine has struggled to gain a significant advantage in aerial warfare. In November of 2024, former President Biden approved the discretionary use of long-range missiles by Ukraine in the ongoing war against Russia. Soon after this decision, top EU diplomat Josep Borrell confirmed that EU countries would follow suit in endorsing Ukraine’s missile use. Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range missiles was seen as a significant escalation in the conflict by the international community and the Russian military due to the devastating implications of such weapons on the battlefield.

Ukrainian Short-Range Missile Capabilities

Early in the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine used short-range ballistic missiles to strike ships carrying conventional arms. In March of 2022, Ukraine launched an OTR-21 Tochka and partially sank a 370-foot Alligator-class Orsk ship capable of carrying 20 tanks and 400 troops. The missile also put two Ropucha-class amphibious assault ships out of commission and severely damaged the surrounding port. This strike against Berdyansky was a crushing blow to Russia's ability to build continuity between Crimea and the Donbas. Striking Russian naval vessels with short-range ballistic missiles proved to be a winning strategy, and so by April 2024, eighty (80) ships had been sunk by Ukrainian forces, decreasing the size of the Russian naval fleet by a third. In addition, Russian air defense units were consciously singled out and destroyed. These examples demonstrate that while long-range missiles can be effective, the bulk of Ukraine's naval victories were won using short-range missiles.  

In April of 2023, The Ukrainian army began preparations for an offensive. However, 8 weeks into the offensive, Russian air defenses on the front lines proved troublesome since they were out of range for Ukrainian munitions. Ukraine was able to come within 300 meters of Russia’s front line, allowing Ukraine to strike Russian forces with HIMARS rockets. The offensive was given new life in October with the approval to deploy several Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). These missiles travel hundreds of kilometers, allowing Ukraine to launch them out of the retaliatory range of Russian air defense. One attack in particular struck two airfields, which hampered the deployment of Russian aircraft. 

The potency of the ATACMS in the Kursk offensive compelled Ukraine to pursue the development of medium-range ballistic missiles of its own. The timeline of development remains unclear, but their first practical deployment came when Ukraine and Russia exchanged barrages of drones and cruise missiles on August 30th, 2023. Out of the twenty-eight (28) cruise missiles and sixteen (16) explosive drones that Russia launched, only one drone made it past Kyiv air defenses. In response, Ukraine launched a wave of drone attacks against Russia, destroying various aircraft. Several regions throughout western Russia were targeted, with the Kremlin reporting that drones were engaged by air defense systems over Moscow, Bryansk, Ryazan, Orlov, and Crimea. Four II-76 aircraft were struck at 700 km by these missiles, but their destructive capability is questionable when you consider only two of the four planes were irreparably damaged. Despite the manufacture of thousands of short-range missiles, domestic varieties of armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery, Kyiv has had difficulty with long-range missile production like the ones used on August 30th.

Ukrainian Missile Defense

Zelensky’s ground forces successfully pushed through the three 75-mile-long defensive lines in Zaporizhia, however, they still had to contend with Russian air superiority. As such, the offensive required PAC-3 missile defense systems to be navigated around minefields and rivers to offset the aerial threat. A standard PAC-3 battery uses radar to interpret the speed and trajectory of the target before allowing the launcher to compute a point of interception. This missile's strength makes it more suitable for battlefield defense than national defense, as it cannot effectively counter intercontinental missiles that reenter the atmosphere at high speeds.

The PAC-3, however, has had difficulty countering “iron bombs” dropped from Soviet-era planes due to their durability and heavy tonnage. Iron bombs are simple to spot and often miss their targets, but when falling freely, they appear as brief radar blips, making it hard for Patriot missiles to track them. These bombs expose aircraft that drop them since they must be above their target to strike it. Russia has begun retrofitting these decades-old bombs with gliding propellers and GPS systems to fire them from longer distances. These FAB-500М-62 gravity bombs can be launched from the ground or Su-24 and Su-35 jets from up to thirty (30) miles away, which places them outside of the range of many anti-aircraft defense systems. Yuriy Ignant, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force, said that intercepting these bombs is not “rational” and the only way to stop their deployment is to “attack the planes that launch these bombs.”

By the end of 2023, the Ukrainian offensive was halted by the onset of sub-zero temperatures and increased frequency of Russian missile barrages. Using a calculated sequence of drones, cruise missiles, and then supersonic ballistic missiles, Russia was able to confuse Ukrainian air defense, and over half of the fifty-nine (59) missiles and drones were able to breach the defenses, exceeding the usual eighty (80) percent interception rate. Among the barrage were KN-23 missiles sourced from North Korea, some of which traveled over 460 km. Forty (40) more drones and missiles were deployed a week later, of which only eight were destroyed. In response, Ukraine used a threefold defense strategy of manned Stinger missiles, medium-range systems such as the IRIS-T and SAMP/T, and hypersonic systems such as the PAC-3.

By March 2024, the residual doubts about the capability of PAC-3 missile systems were largely dispelled. There does not exist a comprehensive record of all missiles shot down by Patriot missiles in the Ukraine war, but they have exceeded the expectations of many analysts. After a lackluster performance against Houthi rebels in 2015 by the Saudis, the PAC-3 proved to be a potent answer to “unstoppable” Kinzhal missiles. A prevailing theory among experts is that the success rate of the PAC-3 in Ukraine is because they are targeting the jets carrying the missiles to destroy them before firing. One proponent of this theory is a defense and security expert at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, Jan Kallberg, who says that placing the launcher far in front of the radar increases the interception rate and has forced Russian pilots to be more cautious in Ukrainian airspace.

Key Aerial Targets

Throughout 2024, Russia continued to target Ukrainian oil refineries to hinder the maintenance of western-supplied vehicles and seed energy insecurity. In addition, oil well exploration has almost completely ground to a halt due to the ferocity of the war. Nodes of Ukrainian energy infrastructure continue to be attacked by Russian missiles, and this, coupled with low exploration rates, indicates that even if the war ended in March 2024, oil production would not return to pre-war levels until 2032. Most Ukrainian oil fields are located close to the Russian border in the Northeast Ukrainian regions of Kharkiv and Poltava. The Shebelinsky refinery in Kharkiv was permanently closed by Naftogaz due to the intense fighting in the region. 

The largest oil refinery, Kremenchuk, near the port of Odessa, has endured several attacks in July 2022 and March 2023. Most recently, in September of 2023, Russia attacked the refinery with drones, causing it to catch fire. These sustained attacks have taken the Kremenchuk out of commission permanently, which is devastating to Ukrainian oil production. In April of 2024, Ukraine sustained another devastating blow to its energy production with the destruction of the Trypilska, its largest thermal power plant. This power plant provides energy for millions of people in Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Zhytomyr regions. Being 50 km south of the Ukrainian capital, air defenses had just over a 40 percent interception rate, with only 18 out of the 42 ballistic and cruise missiles being destroyed mid-flight. Another aerial bombardment of 10 missiles struck energy transformers in Kharkiv, knocking out power for over 200,000 residents. After this attack, Zelensky appealed to the EU for the provision of more Patriot missile defense systems, which are the only weapons that can counteract Russian-made Kinzhal and Zircon missiles.

In April 2024, the Department of Defense (DOD) sent six billion USD of aid to Ukraine to supplement Kyiv’s drone and PAC-3 missile stockpile due to a six-month 46% missile interception rate compared to 73% in the period before. The aid focused on supporting Ukraine's surface-to-air missile capabilities, taking the form of ammunition for HIMARS batteries, artillery, and vehicle-mounted launchers. This was the largest unilateral security assistance package ever committed by the DOD, and it came just a week after the signing of a bill that would slowly provide Ukraine with sixty-one (61) billion dollars over time. This came after Zelensky and Biden met in Paris, where the Ukrainian president reportedly asked for 7 additional Patriot batteries. Biden decided to compromise and send Ukraine more missiles for other anti-air defenses instead and halt the provision of U.S. military technologies to other countries. Biden announced hundreds of missiles for the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS), lamenting that, “Everything we have is going to go to Ukraine until their needs are met.”

Beginning in June 2024, the Sumy oblast of Ukraine had been targeted by dozens of mortars, drones, guided bombs, and over 100 missiles, totaling more than 2,000 strikes. In August of 2024, Ukraine responded by launching another offensive to target Russian launch sites in Kursk to coerce Russia into signing a treaty from a position of strength. To supplement these forces, Latvia provided Ukraine with over 2,500 combat drones. However, Ukraine was denied permission to use British-made Storm Shadow missiles in the incursion, forcing them to get within close range to disable Russian missile launchers. Along a forty-kilometer front, Ukrainian forces quickly breached twelve kilometers deep behind the Russian border, aiming to stymie missile launches and troop movements in the Donbas front. On August 12th, 2024, Oleksandr Syrsky, the Ukrainian chief general, reported that Ukraine had captured 1,000 sq km and seventy-four (74) settlements in the Kursk Oblast. By August 13th, the rate at which Ukraine gained ground within the Kursk region dramatically slowed, with only forty (40) sq. km taken that day. By August 14th, the Ukrainian army breached thirty (30) km deep behind Russian defensive lines, leading to the capture of the small Russian town of Sudzha, on the 15th of August.

On August 18th, 2024, Ukraine mounted a coordinated aerial attack, firing 117 drones and missiles from captured Russian territory. Airfields in Kursk, Savasleyka, Borisoglebsk, and Voronezh were targeted to reduce Russian air attacks, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. On the same day, Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge spanning the Seym River, hindering Russian troops from being able to retreat. The encirclement of forces is often a catalyst for surrender, as was the case in 2015 when thousands of Ukrainian soldiers were encircled in the village of Debaltseve, leading to a ceasefire. After destroying all three bridges spanning the Seym River, the incursion’s trajectory shifted toward vital rail hubs in Pokrovsk and Lgov, where over 900 miles of tracks converge. On August 23rd, US-made GBU-39 glide bombs aided troops in their recapture of the occupied region Kharkiv. By August 30th, Ukraine targeted and destroyed several other bridges using U.S.-made munitions, including the GBU-62 and JDAM-ER glide bombs fired from a MiG-29 fighter jet. This second string of bridge attacks sought to impede the 30,000 relocated Russian soldiers from the east. This attack shows that Ukraine’s Western allies were comfortable with the use of UAVs and traditional munitions in Russia but drew the line at long-range missiles.

Ukraine After Permission To Use Long-Range Missiles

On November 17, Russia launched ninety (90) drones and 120 missiles into Ukraine, killing  ten civilians. The following day, on November 18, Biden permitted Ukraine to use long-range missiles. Early on November 19, Ukraine fired six U.S.-made ATACMS into the Bryansk region. Five were destroyed mid-flight by Russian S-400 and Panzer air defense, and the sixth was damaged before crashing. No casualties or infrastructure damage occurred, making the attack a failure. On November 20, Ukraine used British Storm Shadow missiles and drones to target military facilities in Voronezh, Novgorod, and Belgorod Oblasts, with minimal effect. In response, Putin escalated with the announcement of a new ballistic missile, the "Oreshink," capable of speeds exceeding Mach 10 and separating into six warheads mid-flight. This missile's steep reentry angle and speed make it nearly impossible to intercept, with only Arrow 3 or THAAD systems capable of effectively countering it.

On November 23 and 25, Ukraine launched thirteen more ATACMS to target a military installation and airfield in Kursk, using 188 drones to disrupt Russian air defenses. Despite these efforts, ten ATACMS were shot down. A November 21 launch from Astrakhan hit Dnipro, Ukraine, traveling 800 km in fifteen minutes and causing minimal damage. Satellite imagery showed only roof holes in a weapons facility, easily repaired in weeks. On January 14th, Ukraine bombarded Engels airfield with staggered waves of drones and missiles. Deployed from ranges exceeding 1000 km, Ukrainian dummy drones diverted attention long enough to allow missiles to hit the weapons depot containing Russian FAB glide bombs and cruise missiles. Before dawn on January 15th, Russia retaliated with forty-three (43) missiles accompanied by seventy-four (74) drones; however, all drones failed to reach their target, and thirty (30) missiles were destroyed by Ukrainian air defense. Following these attacks, Zelensky stressed foreign aid, saying, "It is necessary to replenish the stock of anti-missiles for air defense constantly. We need to increase the capacity of mobile fire groups constantly. I am grateful to all the partners who help us."

Conclusion

While Ukraine firing long-range missiles like the ATACMS and Storm Shadow on the battlefield has signaled an intolerable escalation in the eyes of the Russian top brass, these long-range missiles are overestimated. Their potential to change the dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine war is limited by some important obstacles, namely the adeptness of Russian air defense systems, especially the layered S-400 and Pantsir networks. In addition, Ukraine's hampered capacity to produce medium-range missiles has restricted their impact. On the defensive side, Western missile defense systems such as the PAC-3 have greatly enhanced Ukraine’s interception capability; however, their ability to defend against the increasing number of Russian hypersonic Kinzhal missiles and Soviet-era iron bombs has been less successful than expected. However, Russia has become less dependent on allies for missile production. Early in the war, Iran supplied Shahed-136 missiles, but as of June 2025, Russia now has a stockpile of 13,000 and can produce over 200 domestically each month.The growing sophistication and depth of Russia’s missile arsenal, which now includes the hypersonic Oreshink highlights how vulnerable Ukraine’s key infrastructure is to attack despite the presence of advanced defensive technologies. Overall, Western missile and air defense technologies have not achieved the kind of breakthroughs that many expected. While these systems grant some tactical advantages, they are not a magic bullet and will not fundamentally tilt the balance of the conflict in Ukraine’s favor.