Hungary’s Pride Ban: Domestic Concerns and International Intervention
By Isobel Williamson; Edited by Andrew Ma
Introduction
In March 2025, the Hungarian Parliament, led by the illiberal populist Fidesz party, passed by a large majority a bill banning LGBTQ+ assembly, including Pride parades. The bill also mandates only two legal genders, permits the use of artificial intelligence to identify participants in Prides and other pro-LGBTQ+ assemblies and imposes potential fines for participants. Furthermore, the bill strips dual citizens of their Hungarian citizenship, leaving many in legal limbo. Though this legislation is not particularly surprising given Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s track record of targeting the LGBTQ+ community and other minorities, it furthers an alarming agenda and poses significant domestic and international concern.
Since coming to power in 2010, Hungary’s Fidesz party has deconsolidated Hungary’s democracy and passed a series of regressive laws under the guise of “child protection.” Orban has “captured virtually all key institutions inside Hungary,” and increasingly scapegoated the LGBTQ+ community as a threat to national identity. In 2019, Fidesz launched a smear campaign against the LGBTQ+ community and passed a law constitutionally declaring marriage as a union between a man and a woman. In 2020, Orban’s government banned queer couples from adopting children and banned legal gender changes, and in 2021, a law that restricted LGBTQ+ representation in the media generated substantial international press and outcry. The EU has formally intervened several times due to these harsh laws and discriminatory policies, though Orban continues to defy these interventions, even at the cost of billions of euros of funding.
Given that the Orban administration has been violating EU laws for over a decade and a half, and has a long track record of passing regressive laws, why is the March 2025 bill of particular concern? This bill marks a dangerous escalation and demonstrates the limitations of EU governance and interventions—not merely a continuation of Hungary’s illiberal trajectory, but a direct threat to the union’s cohesion. When examining this bill in the current domestic and geopolitical context, it demonstrates that the Orban administration is likely to continue to exploit loopholes within EU legislation and intensify its targeting of LGBTQ+ people and other minority groups, and that future EU infringement tactics are likely to be ineffective.
Domestic Political Context
First, the Hungarian domestic political context suggests that Fidesz may intensify its targeting of the LGBTQ+ community before the upcoming election. In 2022, a leader of the Fidesz party, Péter Magyar, broke away and created an opposition party called Tisza, who quickly rose to prominence within the Hungarian political scene. Though also quite conservative (through their proposition of harsh migration policies for instance), Tisza distinguishes itself from Fidesz through several key policy areas, including holding more pro-EU attitudes. Tisza quickly gained prominence and became a major opponent of Orban’s–with a large enough support base to be considered a significant threat. Fidesz’s recognition of this rivalry was demonstrated by their adjustment of tactics before the 2024 presidential election to start campaigning much earlier than they did in 2022, where they only began mere weeks before the election.
Recent polls show significant support for Tisza; shortly before Parliament passed the anti-LGBTQ+ bill, Tisza had advanced nine percent above Fidesz. Thus, Orban is likely very concerned about consolidating domestic support before the 2026 Hungarian elections, and the March 2025 bill may have been an attempt to pander to far-right actors. International relations experts Resende and Freire (2025) describe how populists exploit voters’ anxieties by vilifying groups of people and portraying themselves as guardians of the nation in order to gain power and influence. The authors analyze how Orban targeted minorities, including the LGBTQ+ community, during the 2018 election to maintain power. Other studies demonstrate how election years can be especially dangerous for minorities when politicians seek scapegoats and instigate smear campaigns and hate speech.
This bill suggests that Orban is likely to intensify his targeting and scapegoating of the LGBTQ+ community before the upcoming elections. Furthermore, this bill has strong symbolic significance. Freedom of assembly is a hallmark of a democratic governmental system, so attempting to stifle LGBTQ+ assemblies symbolizes that Orban seeks to dismantle the core components of a functioning democracy. Cracking down on LGBTQ+ assembly can be perceived as a warning: Orban has the power to repress future assemblies, including those in favor of opposition parties.
Altogether, this bill strongly indicates that Orban feels threatened and is trying desperately to pander to a right-wing voter base–-and that the tactics he is using will likely lead to more intense targeting and suppression of rights to assembly and expression. Orban’s bill did not stop Hungarian queer communities from organizing, and large protests swept the country in response, including a recent massive Pride-turned-anti-Orban rally. Still, many LGBTQ+ community members report feeling concerned and unsafe given this legislation.
EU Infringement
Next, given Hungary’s precedent of dismissing EU intervention within the past several years, and notably since the start of 2025, the passage of this bill could indicate that Hungary intends to sidestep EU interventions in the near future. To govern a supranational union, EU institutions must balance states’ autonomy with common policies and norms. If these institutions believe that certain nations’ policies violate the EU’s treaties and values, they can conduct infringement procedures to enforce compliance. Usually, these infringement procedures begin by delivering formal notice to the state and requesting additional information or a plan to comply with EU policies. The state then has about two months to respond. If the state does not respond in the allotted time frame, or the EU deems its response unsatisfactory, then the nation is referred to the European Court of Justice. If the state still does not comply after being referred, then the EU typically sends the state back to the Court, who will impose fines.
In July 2021, the EU sent a letter to the Orban administration following the ban on LGBTQ+ media representation. This intervention set a new precedent: fifteen member states also advocated against this policy, making it one of the first times that multiple nations and the European Parliament have collectively intervened against one member state. That December, they opened legal proceedings, stating, “the Hungarian provisions also violate human dignity, freedom of expression and information, the right to respect of private life as well as the right to non-discrimination.” The EU’s intervention culminated in fining Hungary about 700 million euros of cohesion funds.
EU legal infringement is clearly not effectively constraining Orban at this point in time. The fines that the EU had in place as of February 2025 were hefty–around 9 percent of Hungary’s GDP. Additionally, Hungary is heavily dependent on EU funds, as they contribute to about one-third of Hungary’s GDP between 2021 and 2027, and total frozen funds equate to about 16 percent. The passage of this bill following substantial intervention since 2021 demonstrates that Orban is seemingly undeterred by future funding conditionality and disregards potential economic austerity on citizens.
International Context
In December 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen released about ten billion euros in frozen funds to Hungary just before a European Council vote to begin negotiations for Ukrainian accession. This funding release temporarily placated Orban and, according to many, disincentivized him from vetoing this vote. Multiple EU member states have also formally requested Ukraine’s accession to be fast-tracked. Given this precedent, it is probable that Hungary will use Ukraine’s accession negotiations as a political bargaining chip to extract as many concessions as possible.
This particular bill is geopolitically charged. The EU has heavily asserted LGBTQ+ rights as a core value, and the existence of Pride celebrations is often used to gauge a candidate nation’s readiness for EU membership. Hungary passing this bill to heavily stifle LGBTQ+ assembly closely follows Putin’s footsteps in repressing LGBTQ+ civil society. It is a clear signal that Hungary looks to symbolically align itself with Russia. As a supranational union, the EU relies somewhat on maintaining a cohesive external image to other actors. Hungary choosing to ban Pride, which the EU has placed extreme importance on in the past several years, also serves to make the EU appear less cohesive to adversaries, and thus weaker and more fractured.
Furthermore, the EU’s capacity to deal with rogue states is finite, especially when there are numerous other pressing issues at hand. Hungary is likely passing these bills not just to impact the situation on the ground domestically, but to take time and attention away from other causes and add additional hoops the EU must jump through to support Ukraine. Passing a bill to ban LGBTQ+ assembly is a major violation of EU principles, and has huge symbolic significance. Additionally, the EU recently passed certain laws regulating the use of artificial intelligence, especially in policing. Orban’s bill carefully found a loophole–sending footage to police slightly after the events, rather than live video. The signs are clear: through defying core values that the EU has created for itself and finding loopholes in established laws, Hungary will push back against defining characteristics of the EU, and will likely continue to closely study EU law, if not to find further loopholes and workarounds as the EU tightens certain regulations.
Conclusion
Viewing the Hungarian Pride ban in the context of domestic political tensions and broader geopolitical context, this bill is more than a continuation of recent illiberal policy. Rather, it demonstrates a dangerous backsliding and an attempt to cause great fracture and discord within the union that is unlikely to be resolved by standard EU intervention tactics. Orban is likely feeling substantial domestic pressure, and may violate the EU’s norms and policies to the greatest extent possible, only to scapegoat the EU or Tisza if additional funds are withheld. The Hungarian 2026 elections, coupled with more advanced Ukrainian accession negotiations likely mean that Orban will try to consolidate power through instilling fear, pandering to the far-right, and passing repressive policies, while refusing to acquiesce and pushing the EU governing bodies to make concessions.
It is unlikely that Hungary will be forced out of the EU at this time. However, it is clear that the union’s cohesion, both from an internal perspective and when considering its external reputation, will be pushed to the absolute limits. Altogether, this situation illuminates the challenges of supranational governance–especially when a state is essentially captured by a particular individual or party.
