Why the Minsk Agreements Failed and the Future of European Security
By Beatrice Ehrhardt
The Minsk agreements of September 2014 and February 2015 were intended to end the war in eastern Ukraine and bring about a lasting solution to the conflict. However, they put forth vague and clashing provisions, and while the West prioritized their implementation, views on the approach were inconsistent, leading to their ultimate failure. Attempts at implementation focused on an unfeasible compromise between two stark contradictions: complete sovereignty for Ukraine and continued Russian control of occupied regions. In finding a solution to the Russia-Ukraine war, there are lessons to be learned from the outcome of the Minsk Accords, and Ukraine needs to be staunchly backed by Europe if an enduring peace is to be achieved.
The Minsk Accords
Signed by Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Minsk-1 agreement of 2014 covered security, humanitarian, economic, and political issues of the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. It called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons, an exchange of prisoners, an economic reconstruction plan, the decentralization of power to occupied Donbas, and the holding of local elections. As the announcement of this ceasefire had little effect, and fighting intensified, emergency negotiations produced a “package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements,” or Minsk-2. Its rushed preparation papered over Russia and Ukraine’s conflicting positions and set out contradictory provisions, many of which heavily favored Russia. In particular, Article 11 called for constitutional reform in which Ukraine would adopt permanent legislation on the special status of Donbas, and additional demands gave the occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk even greater powers, including responsibility for legal regulation of the Russia-Ukraine border. Implementation of these would have effectively destroyed Ukrainian sovereignty, with the Kremlin-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) reincorporated into Ukraine but as distinct political, economic, and legal entities, giving the Kremlin a lasting presence in Ukraine’s political system through its proxies. The German and French leaders who negotiated these agreements were so fixed on achieving a ceasefire that they allowed provisions that were at odds with Ukraine’s sovereignty, and Ukrainian leadership agreed to make these political promises under Russian coercion.
Minsk-2 was inherently ambiguous – because the agreements were conceived as a package, they made no mention of the order in which the provisions should be carried out. Ukraine’s version first re-established control in the east, evacuated Russian troops, and returned the border to Ukraine. Donbas would reintegrate in line with the decentralization program, subordinate to the authority of Kyiv, and Ukraine would be restored as a sovereign state. On the other hand, Russia’s version reversed the sequence, with a political settlement finalized before Ukraine would retake control of Donbas. Elections
would be held in the DNR and LNR, there would be a devolution of power to these regimes, and Russian statelets would be firmed before the border could be returned to Ukraine.
These Russian and Ukrainian interpretations of the Minsk agreements differed and were contradictory. While Western policymakers focused implementation on varying approaches to finding a compromise in which all parties benefitted in some way, Russian leadership remained consistent that their interpretation had to be agreed to. Their view of Ukraine as an internally split, weak, and unstable geopolitical battleground rather than a sovereign state also remained consistent – that support from Western countries, specifically the United States, had prevented it from total collapse, and ending this sponsorship was key. The Minsk agreements failed to explicitly assign any obligation to Moscow, so Russia was able to present itself as a mediator in a domestic Ukrainian conflict. Russia continued with periodic military escalation, economic sanctions, and meddling in Ukraine’s domestic affairs in attempt to convince the world that it was a failed state, aiming for the West to withdraw support and prioritize restoring its ties with Russia so that Ukraine would have to give in to Russian demands.
Western attempts to bridge this divergence of Russian and Ukrainian positions failed, specifically the Morel Plan and Steinmeier Formula. They suggested that free and fair elections in Donbas could happen before Russian troops had been withdrawn and were based on a draft permanent law on special status that Ukraine strongly opposed and would still likely not satisfy Russia. Principally, the Minsk agreements were a quick settlement that contained many holes and vague descriptions of Russia’s commitments, Ukraine’s commitments, and their sequence. By trying to find the middle ground, Western leaders risked further destabilizing Ukraine while still not fulfilling Russia’s demands.
Securing Our Future
Reflecting on the failure of the Minsk Accords now 10 years later, it is clear that Ukraine needs security guarantees in order to commit to a ceasefire – before, during, and after negotiations. It must stabilize and fortify militarily and diplomatically to prevent concessions such as those made in the Minsk agreements and to gain more influence at the negotiating table. Europe’s strong support of Ukraine is vital for these guarantees.
In early March, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom hosted world leaders at the Securing Our Future London Summit to intensify his efforts in pursuit of a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. Starmer reiterated his unwavering support and commitment to protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and security. The summit followed a week of diplomacy for Starmer in which he increased UK defense spending and travelled to Washington, DC to meet with US President Trump for productive dialogue in support of UK and European security. He announced that the UK will cut its foreign aid budget to raise funding for defense from 2.3% to 2.5% of its GDP by 2027 and has made clear the need for Europe to step up for the good of collective security.
Following a highly contentious meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy at the White House in late February, Starmer and French President Macron have decided to step up in attempt to heal the rift between the two leaders. In a plan outlined by Starmer, the UK and France would lead talks on building a “coalition of the willing” to offer security guarantees to Ukraine in the case a ceasefire is reached. They have been working to build a proposal to deploy peacekeeping troops to Ukraine after a truce is hopefully negotiated with Russia. However, a US backstop is essential for any peace deal, and these talks have stalled due to uncertainty over the Trump Administration’s support of this plan to deter Russian President Putin from sending forces against Ukraine again. Starmer also met with Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni after she signaled her willingness to help mend the relationship between the US and Ukraine, claiming that Italy and the UK could play an important role to “build bridges.”
Plans for the summit included discussion of strengthening Ukraine’s position with ongoing military support and increased economic pressure on Russia, a strong peace deal that will deliver long-term security for Ukraine and ensures it is able to defer and defend against future Russian attacks, and the next steps on planning for this guarantee. Starmer reinforced that any peace deal must be backed by strength, unlike the weak Minsk Accords. The Prime Minister said, “In partnership with our allies, we must intensify our preparations for the European element of security guarantees, alongside continued discussions with the United States.” Starmer has made it clear that “there can be no negotiations about Ukraine without Ukraine” and welcomed him to Downing Street ahead of the summit.
The biggest takeaway from Starmer’s Securing Our Future London Summit is that Europe is committing to large-scale rearmament, for itself and Ukraine. Uncertainty in Washington has forced Europe to take greater initiative in securing defense across the continent, and it’s moving toward greater strategic autonomy. New military aid packages are continuing to roll out, and there have already been talks on the financial strategy to support these initiatives. Just days after the summit, EU leaders met for a Special European Council where they discussed financial support for Ukraine, security guarantees, and defense readiness. To date, the EU has provided €135.4 billion to Ukraine, including €49.2 billion in military support, 65% of which has been provided as grants or in-kind support and 35% as highly concessional loans. In coordination with its partners and allies, the EU plans to continue this support with €30.6 billion in 2025 – €12.5 billion will be derived from the Ukraine Facility and €18.1 billion from the G7 extraordinary revenue acceleration loan. President of the European Council António Costa affirmed that “[they] are moving decisively towards a strong and more sovereign Europe of defense.”
Europe has demonstrated its cohesion and commitment to not only supporting Ukraine, but to ramping up its efforts to protect security across the continent, and it’s ready to do so without the help of the United States. Amid the growing transatlantic rift, the US has proven to no longer be a reliable defense partner – the Trump Administration has stopped aid to Ukraine and has surrendered key positions
to Russia without consideration for a just or lasting solution to the conflict. Europe will need to take the lead to ensure peace, and its current strides offer a promising glimpse of an end to US dependency
