An Examination of the Growing Rivalry Between France and Türkiye
Written by Sapna Suresh; Edited by Andrew Ma
Published on July 1st, 2025
In May 2025, during the European Political Community summit in Tirana, Albania, a video of Turkish President Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan grabbing the French President's finger and refusing to shake his hand went viral on social media. This clash was not the first time such an incident between the two leaders occurred. In 2020, Erdoğan said that Macron needed mental treatment over an argument when the French president defended the country’s policy of laïcité after a teacher got beheaded. The personal tension between Macron and Erdoğan illustrates the growing geopolitical rivalry between Ankara and Paris.
Relations between France and the Ottoman Empire date back to the 16th century, when the two countries forged an alliance in 1536. The two states fought their first war from 1798 to 1801, when Napoleon invaded Egypt and Syria, which was under Ottoman control. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, French culture, particularly the French language, was very influential among the Ottoman elite. After the creation of the Turkish Republic, many schools taught French as a foreign language, and it wasn’t until the 1990s that English became used in Türkiye. Even today, many Turkish words are derived from the French language, such as liste (derived from the phrase liste), staj (derived from the word stage), and jandarma (derived from gendarmerie). Importantly, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is credited with making Türkiye a secular country, drew heavy inspiration from the French model of laïcité.
However, despite the deep cultural connections, tensions between the two countries have emerged since the late 2000s, primarily caused by France’s close ties with Armenia and Türkiye’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy that has challenged French interests in the Mediterranean and North Africa.
France’s Close Relations with Armenia
France has the largest Armenian diaspora in Europe and hosts the third largest Armenian diaspora community in the world after the United States and Russia. On January 18, 2001, France became the first Western country to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide, which is when the Young Turks systematically killed Armenians from 1915-1917, which Türkiye continues to deny. In 2012 and 2016, the French parliament voted on a bill that aimed to criminalize Armenian Genocide denial; while the French Constitutional Council rejected it, the attempt by the parliament heightened tensions with Ankara.
In the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the French sided with the Armenians, while the Turks backed the Azeris. During the second Nagorno-Karakabh War in 2020, French President Macron criticized Turkish support for the Azeris as “reckless" and reiterated support for the Armenians. In response, the then-Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that Macron’s comments amounted to French acceptance of Armenian occupation of the region.
In October 2023, France started selling weapons to the Armenians, becoming the first NATO country to sell to a CSTO treaty country, resulting in Turkish backlash. In December 2023, when France sold Armenia 50 armored vehicles, Erdoğan called it a provocation that would risk war.
The Unofficial Anti-Turkish Coalition: The East Mediterranean Gas Forum
Aside from France's support for Armenia, a geopolitical rivalry has emerged in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Levant. At its core, the rivalry is due to Türkiye’s “rise as an emergent power…in a region that Paris traditionally views as part of its sphere of influence.” One area of contention between Ankara and Paris is the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.
As Türkiye seeks to become an energy transport hub and reduce dependency on buying natural gas from Russia and Iran, it has looked to the energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean as an alternative. However, part of the problem is that Türkiye does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus’ (ROC) exclusive economic zone. As a result, Cyprus mobilized a 'coalition' against Türkiye, culminating with the formation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2020. Its original members are Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Cyprus, Greece, Jordan, and Italy. In 2021, France became a member, and the United States joined as a permanent observer. The official purpose of this organization is to foster economic cooperation between the members. However, it has been described as an anti-Turkish coalition as all the members have tensions with Türkiye’s growing stature.
Clashes in Libya
Another area of tension between Paris and Ankara is over the Libyan Civil War, as the two support opposite sides. Since 2014, Libya has been embroiled in a civil war between the UN-recognized Government of National Accord based in Tripoli and the faction led by Khalifa Haftar. The prominent external supporters of the Tripoli-based government include Türkiye and Qatar, while France, Russia, and the UAE have backed Haftar. Over time, the Libyan Civil War caused immense tensions between France and Türkiye.
In 2020, a French naval frigate inspected a Tanzanian-fagged ship over suspicions that it was trafficking arms to Libya with tacit Turkish support. However, according to France, that frigate was "harassed" by three Turkish naval vessels, but the Turks insisted that it was a "friendly" intervention. In response, President Macron accused the Turks of "historic and criminal responsibility," while the Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu accused the French of having a "destructive" role in North Africa. Due to this incident, the French ended their participation in the NATO-led mission Operation Sea Guardian.
That incident between France and Türkiye reflects the two countries competing geopolitical ambitions in the broader Maghreb and West African region. Over the years, military coups in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and others have brought to power governments seeking to end French influence, seeing it as neocolonialism. In this context, the Turks have made inroads in countries like Senegal and Algeria, portraying themselves as a partner against “neo-French imperialism.” Thus, for the French, denying Turkish influence in Libya is part of a broader pushback against growing Turkish influence in former French colonies.
Where Does this Rivalry Go from Here?
In the past, American intervention prevented a hot war between two NATO powers: Greece and Türkiye. However, as the United States seeks to reduce its commitments in the Middle East and North Africa region and with an American president who questions the utility of alliances, various middle powers are seeking to exert their influence.
Given their military prowess and political culture of strategic autonomy, the rivalry between Ankara and Paris is likely to intensify as each country seeks to influence the regional order to their liking in the absence of the United States.